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The development of P2P technology has facilitated content de-
livery in the Internet, and may become the next disruptive tech-
nology. At the same time, however, P2P traffic is consuming a 
large amount of network resources and the management of P2P 
traffic has become a significant problem for ISPs. In the first 
part of this thesis , we study the idea of using usage-based uplink 
pricing as the solution. We develop a simple model describing 
a local market, to explore the effects of uplink pricing on users ' 
P2P usage and ISPs' pricing policies. Our results indicate that 
under business competition, uplink pricing is expected to be 
adopted by all profit-seeking ISPs. Additionally, we also derive 
the optimal pricing strategy if ISPs are to cooperate. Base on 
the simple model, we further discuss how the accounting cost 
would affect the adoption of uplink pricing and how uplink pric-
ing would affect the industry of P2P applications. Our study 
differs from previous studies on usage-based pricing by specifi-
cally focusing on the nature of the P2P technology and a network 
composed of multiple ISPs. 
In the second part, we revisit the idea of Paris Metro Pric-
ing, the simplest differentiated services solution. We develop a 
simple model to assess the viability df this pricing policy com-
pared to one-channel flat-rate pricing. We fo cus on comparing 
t \ 'O-chann l ident ical pricing o one-channel flat- rate pricing in 
t rm of profi t and ocial \velfare. Combined with the work 
in pat li t ratur . It i uggested that the form of quality-of-
, rvic fun t ion i a ke:y factor in d t ermining the viability of 
Pari ~l et r o Pricing. 
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The first dialup Internet Service Provider (ISP) The World open 
up in 1989 brought the network into commerce and the following-
up spread of privately run ISPs promoted the commercializa-
tion of Internet services. Commercial ISPs connecting non-
educational users into Internet leads to a tremendous growth 
of host number in the Internet (Fig. 1.1). Since then , how to 
price the Internet services has been a hotly studied topic. 
Nowadays, it is no secret that the Internet is fill ed with Peer-
to-Peer (P2P) traffic. P2P-based content distribution effectively 
distributes the load from a single server and its uplink to all the 
receivers of the content and the rest of the network. The natural 
question to ask is whether Internet Service Providers (ISPs) will 
be able to estimate the P2P traffic growth and provision enough 
bandwidth for P2P users , and if not quite enough, how ISPs 
will be able to manage the limited resource? Many ISPs, from 
backbone ISPs to small campus network administrators are all 
grappling with these questions. 
Leaving the practicality issues aside for a moment , it seems a 
perfectly reasonable approach is by properly applying pricing to 
reflect the utility of network resource usage. A major part of this 
thesis is a study on exploring such kind of pricing scheme. Inter-
net users are used to flat-rate pricing. The reasons are mostly 
psychological - a consumer prefers not to repeatedly spend the 
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energy making small decisions for incremental network usage. 
Internet content providers, however , often have to negotiate pri-
vate deals with their Internet service providers. The pricing is 
usually based on a combination of bandwidth usage (which costs 
the ICPs) , as well as the value of the I~P content to the ISPs 
(which costs the ISPs) . The use of the P2P technology shifts 
t he bandwidth usage from the ICPs to the users , and at the 
same time makes all the users little ICPs (by offering content). 
Arguably, the negotiated ICP pricing must also be shifted to 
the P2P users . In this thesis , we propose a new pricing method, 
called uplink pricing, which charges users a volume-based fee 
for uplink traffic and a flat-rate fee for downlink traffic. With 
this pricing policy, P2P users who help content distribution will 
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incur some costs to themselves. We develop a model describing 
the scenario where multiple ISPs provide Internet access ser-
vices. We model the heterogeneity of users by assuming they 
have different levels of P2P requirement. Game-theoretic anal-
ysis is carried out to examine the adoption of uplink pricing 
in both competitive case and cooperative case. Results show 
that uplink pricing could be adopted by all ISPs at the equilib-
rium in a competitive market. Further more , we suggest that by 
cooperation ISPs could obtain a higher profit and some threat 
strategy can encourage such cooperation. Extended studies find 
that when the accounting cost in measuring users ' P2P usage 
is considerable, flat-rate pricing would be adopted in the com-
petitive case. We also present a nice demonstration that uplink 
pricing can be treated as a promising method on triggering the 
development of P2P technology. 
A study about the viability of Paris Metro Pricing is pre-
sented in the other part of this thesis. Paris Metro Pricing is 
the simplest differentiated pricing scheme. With such pricing 
scheme, ISPs partition the total capacity into several virtual 
channels and impose differentiated pricing on them. The expec-
tation is that higher-priced channels accommodate less users, 
hence provide better quality of service. Intensive studies have 
been conducted on examining the viability of Paris Metro Pric-
ing [2, 5, 7, 20], particularly its profitability for a monopolist , 
its capability in bringing higher social welfare and the adoption 
of Paris Metro Pricing in a competitive market. Among those 
literature, [2] and [5] focus on comparing two-channel ident i-
cal pricing with two-channel differentiated pricing. While [7] 
and [20] compare one-channel flat-rate pricing with two-channel 
differentiated pricing under some specific congestion functions 
and interestingly these two papers reach opposite results on 
profitability of Paris Metro Pricing. In Chapter 4, we revisit 
this topic and novelly compare the performance between one-
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channel fiat-rate pricing and two-channel identical pricing. We 
find that there are gaps on revenue and social welfare between 
one-channel fiat-rate pricing and two-channel identical pricing. 
We charact erize these gaps under different kinds of quality-of-
service functions. Combined with the result in [2], we present 
the conditions under which Paris Metro Pricing would win out. 
Finally, we also manage to explain the reason behind the oppo-
site results demonstrated in [7] and [20] . 
This thesis has three distinct parts. In Chapter 2, We review 
t he past literature on addressing the Internet pricing policies 
and the viability of those policies. We also present a qualitative 
comparison over those pricing policies. After that in Chapter 3, 
we propose the idea of uplink pricing, present our model in de-
scribing networks with P2P users and examine how ISPs would 
adopt uplink pricing in competitive and cooperative case re-
spectively. We continue to examine the viability of Paris Metro 
Pricing in Chapter 4. We conclude in Chapter 5 with a brief 
summary. 
D End of chapter. 
Chapter 2 
A Review of Pricing in Internet 
Industry 
The commercialization of Internet in late 1980s brought ordi-
nary people (educational or non-educational) into the incred-
ibly magical world of Internet. The development of Internet 
industry is accompanied by continuous studies on pricing poli-
cies. Some simple pricing policies , like flat-rate pricing and 
usage-based pricing are first proposed, since they have been suc-
cessfully implemented in telephony services. Starting from late 
1990s, an unprecedentedly rapid development of Internet appli-
cations presents a large variety of services to the users , including 
video-on-demand services, fast file transfers , voice conferencing, 
instant messaging, etc. These services lead to a dramatic traffic 
volume growth, as well as demand of differentiated services for 
various applications. In this respect , more complicated pricing 
methods are proposed to control the frequent congestion and to 
provide differentiated quality of service. 
We are going to review most of Internet pricing policies in 
the following parts and pay special attention to those that have 
been intensively studied. 
5 
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2.1 Static Pricing 
2.1.1 Flat-rate Pricing 
The idea of flat-rate pricing is quite intuitive: one user pays 
the ISP a rental fee for leasing a certain amount of bandwidth 
and connecting to the Internet , while his/her usage will incur 
no extra charge at all. Flat-rate pricing stands out as the most 
popular pricing policy, adopted by most of the worldwide ISPs, 
but it also causes constantly hot debate [15], [19]. 
The objection towards flat-rate pricing is based on the con-
cern that it would encourage wastes, leading to frequent conges-
tion and lower utilization of network resources. Besides , treat-
ing all packets equally makes flat-rate pricing incompatible with 
quality-differentiated services. The Internet Demand Experi-
ment (INDEX) [1] provides an empirical evidence showing that 
the average number of bytes transmitted under flat-rate pricing 
is far more than under other pricing methods involving usage 
metering. 
However, although supporters admit that flat-rate pricing has 
shortcomings theoretically, they still strongly believe this pricing 
policy would win out because of its simple pricing structure and 
consumers' strong preference towards simplicity. Consumers' 
willingness to pay a flat-rate price is also empirically studies in 
INDEX project. It is shown that the majority of the subjects se-
lected a flat-rate , unlimited-access pricing plan, when they were 
offered options with different bandwidth-price plans. In partic-
ular , many subjects were paying a premium, which is defined as 
the amount of money one subject chose to pay for his usage mi-
nus the the amount of money he would have paid if he makes a 
expenditure-minimizing choice. The premium reflects the addi-
tional benefit users felt from using the bandwidth freely without 
being metered. This is a psychological reason why users prefer 
fiat-rate pricing- a consumer prefers not to repeatedly spend the 
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energy making small decisions for incremental network usage. 
2.1.2 Usage-based Pricing 
Simple usage-based pricing is designed as metering users' usage , 
connecting time or desired bandwidth and charging a certain 
amount of money per unit. Although several empirical studies 
have shown that usage-based pricing is not preferred by the 
users [1], the pressure of increasingly massive traffic and frequent 
network congestion is so overwhelming that some ISPs consider 
trying out usage-based pricing. 
So as to inherit the simplicity of fiat-rate pricing and to cater 
to users' willingness in buying out bandwidth , the most common 
form of usage-based pricing is designed as: users are allowed to 
deliver a certain volume of data for a buyout price , and are 
charged a volume-based extra fee for the data beyond that al-
lowance. This form of pricing is well adopted in New Zealand 
and Chile. 
The comparison between usage-based pricing and fiat-rate 
pricing has been analyzed empirically and theoretically, [1] , [15] , 
[14], etc .. In [15], a practical variation of usage-based pricing is 
examined, a two-part tariff, which charges a fiat-rate price as the 
fee to get initial access to the Internet plus extra usage-based 
charge. A Hotelling-type model is developed to examine which 
pricing method will be adopted in a duopoly competition. Users ' 
demand is assumed to be negatively related to the usage-based 
price charged; if the usage-based price is p, users ' demand would 
be 1 - p. The two networks in competition are assumed to be 
incompatible, so that the total demand from one network D pro-
duces a positive network effect, nD, in which n is the network 
effect parameter and also congestion is interpreted as reduction 
inn. It is also assumed that an extra cost m would be induced 
for the ISPs when they charge an extra usage price , which can 
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be viewed as the accounting cost for measuring users' usage. 
Based on this simple model , game-theoretic analysis shows that 
when the accounting cost is sufficiently small, two-part tariff is 
the unique equilibrium, but when the accounting cost is suffi-
ciently large , flat-rate pricing would be the unique equilibrium. 
For the case with intermediate value of the accounting cost, the 
equilibrium state is related to the network effect: there would 
be no equilibrium if network effect is really high, which can be 
viewed as the situation when networks are perfectly incompati-
ble or less congested; while both pricing policies can be adopted 
at equilibrium if network effect is sufficiently low, which means 
networks are more compatible or more congested. 
Up till now, usage-based pricing has been proven to be less 
preferable psychologically [1] but theoretically viable under com-
petition if the cost to implement it is sufficiently small [15]. 
Clearly, the debate over flat-rate pricing and usage-based pric-
ing is still going to be an open question waiting for further in-
vestigation. 
2.1.3 Paris Metro Pricing 
Concerning the incompatibility of flat-rate pricing with quality-
differentiated services, A. Odlyzko [18] proposed Paris Metro 
Pricing , the simplest differentiated services solution. Paris Metro 
Pricing is to partition the whole bandwidth into several logi-
cally separate channels, which differ only in the price paid to 
use them. There is no guaranteed service for any channel and 
pricing is the primary tool to manage traffic. It is expected 
that the channels with higher prices would attract less pack-
ets so that provide better quality of service, in terms of lower 
congestion cost. Generally, different applications have different 
requirements on transmission delay, so when a user steps into 
the network, he needs to make the decision of which channel to 
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send his packets on, based on the delay requirement of his pack-
ets and his budgets as well as his observation of the congestion 
situation in different channels. 
After A. Odlyzko proposed the idea of Paris Metro P ricing 
(PMP), some researchers have worked on building mathematical 
models to address the viability of PMP [2 , 5, 7, 20]. We will 
revisit this topic in detail in Chapter 4. 
2.2 Dynamic Pricing 
Unlike static pricing, where ISPs set a price according to t he 
market and keep that price constant for a certain period of time, 
dynamic pricing requires interaction between customers and ac-
counting systems , and the price, either fixed-rate or volume-
based, would fluctuate according to the network situation . In 
this section, we are going to review some of the typical dynamic 
pricing schemes and examine their viability. 
2.2.1 Smart-market Pricing 
Smart-market pricing [13] was proposed as early as 1993 , so as 
to reflect the true cost of providing Internet access services, to 
utilize bandwidth resources more efficiently and to resolve t he 
congestion problem. 
In [13], in addition to those monetary cost s, including band-
width cost, management cost , network expansion cost , etc ., con-
gestion is also recognized as a social cost , which is induced to 
those delayed or discarded packets. When the network is not 
congested, actually the incremental cost to deliver a packet is 
almost zero, so the packets should not be charged addit ionally. 
However when the network is congested , to reflect t he higher 
incremental (social) cost , an extra price should be charged for 
delivered packets . Smart-market pricing incorporat es t he Vick-
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rey auction to implement such prices. A "bid" field is added 
in its header which indicates the highest willingness-to-pay for 
t his packet. The network collects all the bids and calculates a 
cutoff value, which is the bid of the marginal user and which 
is lower than the bids of all the delivered packets. This cutoff 
value reflects the marginal congestion cost to deliver those pack-
et s and each delivered packet is charged this price. If we assume 
the incremental cost of delivering one packet when there is no 
congestion as zero , this per-packet price is just the congestion 
pr1ce. 
As more congestion means less packets admitted, intuitively, 
t he congestion price in smart-market pricing increases as con-
gestion increases, which implies its special feature of reflecting 
congestion. Besides , with smart-market pricing, only the pack-
ets with the highest bids , or say, the packets which are the most 
valuable, would be admitted , which realizes differentiated ser-
vices . Unlike traditional differentiated services , in which net-
works t reat applications with different QoS requirements differ-
ently, smart-market pricing transfers the job of differentiation to 
the user-end - customers are to decide what level of QoS their 
packets require. 
Alt hough smart-market pricing exhibits many desirable fea-
tures in reflecting congestion and providing differentiated ser-
vices, some inconvenient limitations still hinder its practical 
implementation . The process of assigning bids, collecting bids 
and determing the cutoff value definitety increase the account-
ing overhead. Higher accounting cost might discourage ISPs to 
adopt smart -market pricing unless the revenue increment can re-
cover the extra cost. Whether smart-market pricing could bring 
higher profit to ISPs can be an open question for further in-
vestigation. In addition , assigning bids could also bother the 
customers, because it is no easy job to determine one 's highest 
willingness-to-pay for the packets. Lack of information might 
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lead to false bid, which either causes higher expendit ures for 
users or loss of important packets. 
2.2.2 Responsive Pricing 
The concept of responsive pricing ( [12] , [16]) incorporates t he 
feedback scheme, which is a well-established method in improv-
ing network efficiency, and exploits users ' adaptive nature. Like 
the traditional TCP congestion control scheme, where a feed-
back message is sent back to adjust the data input rates , in 
responsive pricing a component varying with the st at e of net-
work congestion is transmitted back to the users in the form of 
a price per packet. 
Similar to the smart-market pricing, responsive pricing charges 
zero when network is not congested. However , when the network 
is congested and it is observed that some packet s are experi-
encing QoS degradation, the congestion will be measured and 
converted into a price per packet. The expect ation is t hat users 
will adapt to per-packet price by reducing the number of packets 
sent and thereby release the congestion. 
The key issue related to responsive pricing is how hetero-
geneous users would adapt to the feedback. Adaptive users are 
classified into two types , elastic users and inelastic users. Elast ic 
users normally possess higher delay tolerance but require mini-
mum loss of the whole file. On sensing the network congestion, 
elastic users will evaluate their willingness-to-pay under current 
per-packet price and their loss of utility if delaying the trans-
mission to less congested stage, then decide how many packets 
to send in current stage. To the contrary, inelastic users cannot 
tolerate transmission delay but experience smaller QoS degrada-
tion with packet loss. One example is the users delivering video 
with a two-level codec, the first level of which includes t he min-
imum essential information for the video but the second level of 
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which helps enhance the quality of video. On receiving positive 
packet price, these users could adjust the amount of information 
related to the video delivered, namely provide different playback 
rates for the video [12]. 
One shortcoming with this kind of feedback scheme is that 
there is at least a one-period lag between the network state 
the users are informed of and the network state they are going 
to experience. The congestion level will be different from what 
users have presumed when they make decisions on the amount of 
packets to transmit. In this respect, smart-market pricing falls 
into a special case of responsive pricing with a "tight loop". In 
smart-market pricing, networks collect users' willingness-to-pay 
first and only deliver those packets whose "bid" is higher than 
the cutoff value. Therefore no feedback delay is incurred. 
Simulation carried out by MacKie-Mason et al. [12] on com-
paring priced networks with unpriced networks shows that the 
average loss percentage is smaller and users' valuation of the 
delivered packets is larger with responsive pricing. This result 
implies that responsive pricing could increase the efficiency in 
utilizing network resources and also provide better QoS expe-
rience for users. However, implementing responsive pricing re-
quires extra interaction at the user ends, as well as considerable 
process overhead. Some viability issues still need careful exam-
ination before wide adoption of this pricing scheme, including 
users ' attitude on frequent interaction with ISPs during web-
surfing activities , and the extra accounting cost for measuring 
congestion and calculating prices. 
2.2.3 Edge Pricing 
Most literature about Internet pricing have focused on achieving 
optimal social welfare , which requires charging marginal con-
gestion cost for usage , like what we have reviewed above. [22] 
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redirects the research on Internet pricing away from optimality 
paradigm to a new paradigm: the edge pricing. 
It is argued that optimality issues should not dominate the 
research agenda about Internet pricing. Charging based on 
marginal congestion cost probably cannot recover the total fa-
cility cost needed in building and operating the networks , espe-
cially with rapid development in networking technology. There-
fore, marginal congestion cost is no longer relevant to the pricing 
issue. Even though marginal cost pricing is enough in recovering 
the facility cost, it is argued in [22] that the marginal conges-
tion costs are however inaccessible. Normally congestion cost 
is defined as the QoS degradation of users incurred by network 
congestion, but how the congestion would influence users' util-
ity is actually complicated. Unknown users' utility functions 
make this problem even more difficult. Congestion might lead 
to packets delay or even packet loss, which affect different appli-
cations in different degrees. For example, occasional packet loss 
might cause tremendous trouble for email senders or receivers, 
but could have negligible effect on online video-on-demand ex-
perience. Besides, the evaluation of congestion along the entire 
transmission path requires computation at each hop , like smart-
market pricing, which entails considerable complexity. There-
fore, if not impossible , it is practically difficult to measure the 
congestion cost. Based on the above criticism, [22] advocates to 
shift attention from optimal pricing issue to some architectural 
issues, including the possibility to price locally, how to price 
multicast and the ability to charge receivers. 
A new paradigm called edge pricing supports a wide variety of 
locally implemented pricing schemes other than uniform pricing 
policy to achieve the optimal welfare. To approximate the con-
gestion cost, the current congestion condition is replaced by the 
expected congestion condition, which is essentially QoS-sensitive 
time-of-day pricing. This pricing does not reflect instantaneous 
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congestion fluctuations , but encourages users to shift their us-
age to less-congested (low-priced) hours. To approximate the 
congestion cost , the cost of the actual path is also replace by 
the cost of the expected path, which only depends on the source 
and destination. The price related to the expected congestion 
on the expected path therefore can be determined locally at ac-
cess points (or edges). S. Shenker et al. have not proposed any 
scheme on the detailed nature of charging, like flat-rate pricing 
or usage-based pricing, but they believe that since pricing is de-
termined complet ely locally, ISPs would figure out the most ap-
propriat e policies through the interaction with subscribers and 
t he market competition. Fig. 2.1 illustrates one example of this 
edge pricing. The packet originating from network A is charged 
according to network A's local charging policy. If this packet 
ends inside network A, it is only charged once. However, if 
t his packet leaves network A for network B, when it enters net-
work B, it will be charged against network A's bill according to 
network B's local pricing policy. This example also implies that 
t he implementation of edge pricing requires bilateral agreements 
among ISPs and falls into local pricing afterwards. 
S. Shenker et al. also discuss the non-local issues, like the 
challenges of pricing multicast applications and charging the re-
ceivers . All t hese issues are open for further researches. 
2.3 Comparisons 
In previous sections, we have reviewed several typical Internet 
pricing policies, from flat-rat e pricing to Paris Metro Pricing, 
from smart-market pricing to edge pricing. We will identify 
each of t hem with its unique features and carry out a qualitative 
comparison in the following part. 
Flat-rate pricing stands out as the simplest, the most popular 
pricing policy of all , and probably the most preferable one from 
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Figure 2.1: An example of edge pricing 
customers' viewpoint. It has been critiqued for its inefficiency in 
utilizing network resources, and its lack of differentiated services. 
Usage-based pricing arises to improve the efficiency in utilizing 
network resources. Flat-rate pricing versus usage-based pricing 
has been the hottest debate in Internet pricing area. Paris Metro 
Pricing falls into a multi-class flat-rate pricing, which realizes 
differentiated services with the least complexity. The static price 
setting in the above three pricing policies is incapable of tuning 
the price to reflect the congestion fluctuations inside the net-
works. Smart-market pricing and responsive pricing both tune 
the per-packet price according to the network conditions , there-
fore provide dynamic pricing to release the congestion. Edge 
pricing is a pricing policy which deviates from the traditional 
research track and novelly addresses the architectural issues re-
lated to network pricing. 
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On the one hand , dynamic pricing incorporates the interac-
t ion with customers and the price is adaptive to the network 
condition , therefore it is respectively more complicated than 
static pricing. On the other hand, at the cost of complexity, 
dynamic pricing helps allocate network capacity more efficiently 
and provides differentiated services , which are the central is-
sues in designing network pricing policies. However, due to psy-
chological reasons , simpler pricing is always more favorable to 
t he customers , which makes the practical implementation of dy-
namic pricing uneasy. In summary, Table 2.3 demonstrates a 
qualitative comparison over all the pricing policies we have re-
viewed. 
P rice Service Usage Customer Complexity 
flexibility differentia- constrain interaction 
t ion 
Flat-rate Low No No No Low 
.. pn c1ng 
Usage- Low No Yes No Low 
based 
pnc1ng 
PMP Low Yes No Yes Medium 
Smart- High Yes Yes Yes High 
market 
.. pnc1ng 
Responsive High Yes Yes Yes High 
pnc1ng 
Edge pnc- Medium Yes Yes No High 
1ng 
Table 2.1: Comparisons among different pricing policies 
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2.4 Concluding Remarks 
When people talks about Internet pricing, the most heated topic 
they could discuss is the debate over fi at-rat e pricing versus 
usage-based pricing. Apart from that , past literature also pro-
posed some other more complicated pricing policies . In t he 
above parts, we review the most widely-researched pricing poli-
cies, which can be classified into two types, static pricing and 
dynamic pricing. Dynamic pricing enables more efficient ut i-
lization of the capacity resources by charging according to t he 
congestion level and providing differentiated services, at the cost 
of considerable complexity. Customers' preference towards sim-
plicity and transparency forces simpler pricing ways, like fiat-
rate pricing and usage-based pricing, to stand out as the most 
popular ones. Comparisons in Section 2.3 show that no pricing 
policy is perfect , therefore, further study on how to implement a 
trade-off scheme that could capture the strengths of t hose pric-
ing policies is essential in study on Internet pricing. 
D End of chapter. 
Chapter 3 
U plink Pricing 
3.1 Introduction 
An important recent trend in Internet 's development and evolu-
tion is the increasing use of Peer-to-Peer (P2P) technology for 
content distribution. This development has the effect of flatten-
ing the Internet, and leading to a new data transfer architecture 
for the Internet in the next ten years [25]. Whether these new 
network technologies and mechanisms will be adopted and used 
will be resolved by the "tussle among the stakeholders" in the 
Internet [3]. In this sense, this chapter is a study of the "tussle" 
rather than the technology itself. 
At some level of abstraction, the important stakeholders of 
the Internet are: the ISPs , the users , and the content providers 
(ICPs). Furthermore, the ISPs can be categorized according to 
their distinct roles: (a) access ISPs (also referred to as "eye-
ball" ISPs) connect users to the Internet; (b) content ISPs al-
low content to be accessed from the Internet; and (c) transit 
ISPs provide the conduit connecting users to content. These 
ISPs connect with each other via bilateral peering agreements 
to form the Internet. Figure 3.1 illustrates the situation. 
Roughly speaking, both access ISPs and content ISPs pay 
transit ISPs according to volume of traffic. The content ISPs 
also tend to charge ICPs according to traffic volume to cover 
18 
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Content distribution in 
client-server mode 
Content distribution 
in P2P mode 
Peering agreement 
Financial settlement 
Figure 3.1 : St ructure of Internet industry 
transit costs1 . Due to a variety of reasons , however, access 
ISPs usually charge users (eyeballs) only a flat fee , indepen-
dent of traffic sent or received. The P2P technology, however, 
has blurred t he difference between ICPs and users, in terms of 
the traffic t hey generat e. In the flattened Internet, the peers 
are both users as well as content servers. The volume of traffic 
from the ICPs is shifted and distributed to the peers. This in 
turn results in dramatic shifts in traffic patterns in the entire 
Internet . It is t herefore no longer consistent to apply the same 
flat-rate pricing t o both P2P users and non-P2P users. 
In the world of bilateral peerings and flat-rate pricing by ac-
1The relationship between ICPs and ISPs is generally more complicated since content 
can also help ISPs increase their business. Therefore ICPs may be able to negotiate with 
ISP according to other factors than just traffic volumes . 
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cess ISPs, many access ISPs are concerned about whether they 
are fairly compensated for the traffic they are carrying. On the 
one hand, they don't welcome the increased traffic volume due 
to P2P(except the content ISPs); but on the other hand , they 
know the P2P technology is helping content delivery and avail-
ability, and hence will likely bring new customers. This tussle 
between ISPs and P2P content distribution has been studied in 
some recent papers [4], [26]. 
As a solution, some ISPs have tried to cap the P2P traffic. 
Longer term, ISPs are working to localize P2P traffic [29]. We 
postulate that the best solution is to introduce more consistent 
pricing and let the market forces deal with it. We propose a new 
pricing scheme called uplink pricing, where one user is charged 
a fixed-rate price for the downlink bandwidth, but is charged 
a different fee based on its uplink traffic volume. With this 
pricing policy, P2P users who help content distribution will incur 
some costs to themselves. Most importantly, uplink pricing is 
designed to price consistently for services as they are delivered. 
Fig. 3.2 shows a simplistic representation of the ISP market , 
in which one content ISP and M access ISPs are connected to the 
transit ISP and there is no bilateral peering agreement between 
any two access ISPs. Among all possible varieties of workload 
models, we address one specific case to compare different pricing 
models. The workload is simply that, besides some background 
traffic, there is respectively one end-user in each ISP requesting 
the same unit of data, which is initially stored at the server. The 
traffic flow with and without P2P distribution can be different: 
• Client-server mode (Fig.3.2( a)): The server respectively up-
loads this unit of data to each end-user, therefore uploads 
M units in total. 
• P2P mode (Fig.3.2(b)): The server up loads this unit of 
data to some of those requesting end-users and the data is 
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also distributed among end-users. 
Access ISPs have three options to charge the end-users, flat-
rat e pricing, usage-based pricing and uplink pricing. In the fol-
lowing part , we study the charge of access ISPs, as well as the 
cost induced for all ISPs under different pricing models in both 
client-server mode and P2P mode. 
A. Client-server Mode 
Without P2P 's help in distributing the content , the server would 
inj ect the content M times into the content ISP who forwards 
the dat a to each end-user through the transit ISP. The content 
ISP charges the server for uploading M units of data and pays 
t he transit ISP for those data as well. If we assume that content 
ISP charges Pcu per data unit and transit ISP charges Pt per data 
unit, t he cost induced by this specific workload for the content 
ISP would be M * Pt, while the charge from server is M* Pcu· At 
t he end of access ISPs , each one is charged 1 * Pt by transit ISP 
for downloading one unit of data, but the access ISP's revenue 
relies on it pricing strategy. 
• Flat-rat e pricing: The access ISP charges its subscribers 
t he same price Pi for leasing the bandwidth for a certain 
t ime interval , so the revenue is n *Pi if the number of users 
in each ISP is n . 
• Usage-based pricing: Suppose the access ISP charges a fee 
based on downloading volume, the end-user who requests 
the data pays 1 * Pu and the others pay nothing, so the 
ISP 's revenue is 1 * Pu, in which Pu is the price for per unit 
of downloading volume. 
• Uplink pricing: If we denote the flat-rate price for downlink 
asp and the volume-based price for uplink as q, all the users 
are only charged p for downloading and the revenue is n * p. 
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The second column of Table 3.1 sums up the above analysis. 
B. Peer-to-Peer Mode 
Wit h the help of P2P technology, the data requested directly 
from t he server will be less than in the client-server mode and 
extra flows of traffic will be generated between end-users. We 
are going t o address one extreme case of workload with P2P data 
distribution. One end-user , say the user inside ISPM without 
loss of generality, first downloads this unit of data from the 
server and then uploads it to all the other M - 1 users who 
request t his dat a . In this extreme case, the cost of content ISP 
decreases t o 1 * Pt and its revenue decreases to 1 * Pcu accordingly. 
In t hose access ISPs other than ISPM (denoted by ISP_M), the 
traffic flow remains the same as under the client-server mode, 
so do t he revenue and costs. In IS PM, M - 1 units of outgoing 
data and one unit of incoming data would incur a transit fee of 
(M -1) *Pt · If flat-rate pricing is adopted , each user inside I SPM 
is nevert heless charged PJ for accessing the Internet, because this 
pricing strat egy is insensitive to the traffic volume, so IS PM's 
revenue remains as n * p f. If usage-based pricing is adopted, as 
the user 's downloading volume remains unchanged, he is charged 
Pu and I S PM's revenue is still Pu· However , if ISPM adopts 
uplink pricing, t he user who distributes data will be charged an 
addit ional fee of (M - 1) * q for its up loading traffic and IS PM 's 
revenue goes ton* p + (M ~ 1) * q. The third column of Table 
3.1 demonstrates t he analysis for the P2P traffic mode. 
CHAPTER 3. UPLINK PRICING 24 
Client-server Peer-to-Peer 
Mode Mode 
content Cost M*Pt 1 * Pt 
ISP Revenue M *Pcu 1 * Pcu 
Cost 1 * Pt 1 * Pt 
ISP_M Flat-rate n * PJ n * PJ 
Revenue Usage-based 1 * Pu 1 * Pu 
U plink pricing n*p n*p 
Cost 1 * Pt (M- 1) * Pt 
ISPM Flat-rate n * PJ n *Pi 
Usage-based 1 * Pu 1 * Pu 
Revenue n*p 
Uplink pricing n*p 
+(M-1) *q 
Table 3.1: Cost and revenue of each ISP with different workload models 
We make the following observations from the above table: 
• P2P traffic distribution shifts part of the cost from the 
server end to the access ISPs , flattening the Internet. In 
either fiat-rate pricing or usage-based pricing, this shift of 
cost is not reflected in the charging method. 
• If we view the data originated from end-users in P2P mode 
as same as the data input by servers, uplink pricing is con-
sistent with the pricing model in traditional client-server 
mode, where servers are charged based on usage regard-
ing the traffic injected into the Internet and clients are 
charged a fiat-rate price regardless of the traffic downloaded 
by them. 
• Uplink pricing only imposes a fiat-rate fee on the user who 
does not upload data. In other words , users will be charg d 
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a flat-rate price for their end-user behavior and a usage-
based price for their server behavior. The dissatisfaction 
incurred by usage-based charge would be reduced to the 
lowest degree so that only the users acting like servers are 
bothered. This difference from usage-based pricing makes 
us believe if ISPs want to control the increasingly massive 
volume of P2P traffic by adopting pricing policy, uplink 
pricing would be better than usage-based pricing on the 
grounds that it only penalizes the users who actually cause 
the massive traffic. 
The main contribution of the work in this chapter is to create 
a plausible model of user behavior (with different requirements 
on P2P usage) and ISP costs , so that the adoption of usage-
based uplink pricing can be analyzed, both in the context of a 
competitive market as well as a cooperative setting for ISPs. Ini-
t ially, in Section 3.2 , we start with the description of our model, 
in which users' different preference towards P2P applications is 
reflected by t heir different P2P demands. The market equilibria 
are derived in Section 3.3 and Section 3.4, for competitive and 
cooperative cases respectively. Then in Section 3.5 , we make 
further discussion on accounting cost and P2P locality. Related 
works and conclusions are give in Section 3.6 and 3.7. 
The following is a summary of the main conclusions: 
• If ISPs do not cooperate but compete through pricing, even-
t ually t hey will all adopt uplink pricing and they will set a 
price t hat can merely cover the ISP 's operation cost, and 
each ISP 's profit is zero at equilibrium. 
• ISPs can always achieve higher profit by cooperating on 
uplink pricing, and the threat strategy can encourage such 
cooperation. 
• When users ' marginal utility from P2P usage cannot cover 
the cost induced by out bound P2P traffic , in either compet-
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itive case or cooperative case, ISPs set a sufficiently high 
price for uplink traffic to block the P2P usage. 
• If the accounting cost is taken into consideration, the even-
tual equilibrium is either for all ISPs adopting fiat-rate pric-
ing, or all uplink pricing, depending on the P2P traffic de-
mand in the network and the accounting cost. 
• The global adoption of uplink pricing will trigger the im-
provement on P2P locality. 
Usage-based network pricing has been proposed and studied 
before [9, 11, 15]. The basic treatment models how user 's util-
ity is affected by congestion, and how usage-based pricing can 
increase social welfare. The reason that usage-based pricing is 
seldom adopted has also been explained by Clark (1997) and oth-
ers: (a) users' resistance to unpredictable charges; (b) fiat rate 
tends to help business growth; (c) accounting costs. Further-
more, [9] derives a very helpful general observation from their 
analytical model about when fiat-rate (or usage-based) pric-
ing is preferred: depending on whether the network resources 
are abundant (or congested). In comparison to these previ-
ous works, our model includes multiple ISPs. We are able to 
avoid modeling congestion by assuming the usage-based charge 
by transit ISPs reflects the effect of increased traffic. In this 
sense, we feel our model is better able to represent the compli-
cated tussle between the Internet stakeholders. 
3.2 Model Description 
We consider the simplest representation of a competitive ISP 
market, consisting of M homogeneous ISPs competing for a pop-
ulation of N subscribers. The homogeneity of ISPs presents as 
identical operation cost function, to be detailed later in this sec-
tion. Initially, all ISPs adopt fiat-rate pricing, with the same 
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price p 0 . Therefore , each ISP has a subscriber population of 
~, and shares a portion it of the total profit generated in this 
market. 
The idea of uplink pricing is to divide the user subscription 
price into two parts: (a) a flat-rate charge p for regular us-
age, like web-surfing, sending and receiving emails, or online-
chatting, etc.; and (b) a usage-based component q designed to 
charge the user for P2P usage , with which the user is behaving 
as a server (or ICP). Under uplink pricing, the subscription price 
p, can be expressed as 
p~p+vq. (3.1) 
The parameter v represents the uplink traffic volume generated 
by a user , and q is the charge per volume of traffic. 
We are interested in modeling the user behavior due to uplink 
pricing, and in turn how the multi-ISP market scenario affects 
the eventual adoption of uplink pricing by ISPs. We make a 
number of assumptions on stakeholders involved in the model, 
traffic , ISP costs and user behavior (utility function and P2P 
usage). 
A. Stakeholders 
The Internet is complicated by potentially conflicting goals of 
many different stakeholders. In our model , we assume that the 
relationship between content providers and ISPs is given. What 
will be considered in our model is only the ISP-ISP and ISP-user 
part. For simplicity, we assume that the only way of inter-ISP 
communication is through transit ISPs , and there is no bilateral 
agreement between any two access ISPs. 
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B. Traffic 
In the client-server mode, a downloading user in the access net-
work generates a larger volume of downlink traffic but pract i-
cally no uplink traffic. The situation is the reverse for the servers 
(or ICPs). As a result , traffic at the peering link of the t ransit 
ISP is different depending on whether its downstream is pre-
dominantly access ISPs or content ISPs. In the former case, t he 
peering traffic is mostly outbound for the transit provider (in-
bound for the access ISP); whereas in the latter case, the traffic 
is mostly in bound for the transit provider. When the down-
stream has both access and content ISPs , the peering link can 
have more balanced traffic. This is illustrated in Fig. 3.3. 
1 
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Figure 3.3: Traffic at t he peering link of t he t ransit ISP 
CHAPTER 3. UPLLlVK PRICING 29 
With the advent of P2P technology, P2P users in access net-
works may also upload a large volume of traffic, which changes 
the traffic characteristics at the peering links between access 
ISPs and transit ISPs. To simplify our model, we assume that 
even with P2P traffic, the downlink traffic between one access 
ISP and its transit ISP is always larger than the uplink traffic. 
This assumption does not stray too far from the reality. For 
example , in the client-server mode, an access ISP with no ICP 
subscriber uploads Vu to its transit ISP and downloads vd. Vu is 
smaller than vd as we explained in the previous paragraph. With 
P2P traffic, we can expect that the extra downlink traffic due 
to P2P vd(P2P) is comparable to the extra up link traffic Vu(P2P), 
that is 
Vd(P2P) ~ Vu(P2P) · 
As a whole , 
Vd + Vd(P2P) > Vu + Vu(P2P), 
and this is what we have assumed, that an access ISP always 
downloads more than uploading. 
Up till now, traffic locality of P2P applications is still an 
open question [24], [27]. In [27], J.H. Wang et al. managed to 
suggest a function describing the inter-ISP traffic when there is 
no peering link between two access ISPs, 
r ( 1 - r ( o:i)) G ( ci - ti) ( ) t . == npa · 3 2 2 
( 1 - r ( o:i)) G ( ci - ti) + ~ ( o:i) 2 • 
In (3.2), ti denotes the private traffic traversing the transit ISP. 
r (a) is defined as a caching function, a non-decreasing func-
tion of a, the market share (or population size) of the ISP. 
G ( ·) is defined as the performance sensitivity function, which 
describes the sensitivity of the routing to the link performance, 
and G (-) == 1 means routing is not affected by link performance. 
c~· represents the capacity of this private link (the link to the 
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transit ISP), and npai can be simply viewed as the total traffic 
generated inside the IS Pi. 
We borrow function (3.2) for our model. In our model, the 
link between access ISP and transit ISP is never saturated , which 
means the link performance is always good enough for transmit-
ting outbound traffic. Therefore , in our model, G(ci· - t i' ) 1n 
(3.2) is equal to 1, and then original function becomes 
(3.3) 
Given the total volume of traffic generated inside the network , 
the fraction of outbound traffic is simply 1 - r ( a i), which is 
solely related to ISP/s market share. For web traffic, r(a) is 
the probability that a subscriber 's request can be satisfied by its 
ISP's local network when the subscriber 's ISP is with a market 
share of a, and this caching function depends on the location of 
servers. For P2P traffic , r( a) is related to neighbor selection al-
gorithms of P2P applications or caching strategies implemented 
by ISPs. Therefore, this caching function can be different for 
regular traffic and P2P traffic. We distinguish them by denoting 
the caching function as r r ( ·) for regular traffic and r P ( · ) for P2P 
traffic. Besides, the difference of market share between ISPs in 
a local market is negligible compared to the huge size of global 
market. On this ground, we assume that the caching function is 
identical for all ISPs , but we do distinguish the caching functions 
between regular traffic and P2P traffic, rT and rp respectively. 
C. ISP Costs 
Each ISP has sufficient funds for capital investments to support 
all users in the market if necessary, so we do not explicit ly con-
sider capital costs , but only an ISP 's operating cost. We assume 
there are four components to the operating cost: 
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The first component C1 is a fixed cost, which includes the cost 
for device maintenance, the personnel salaries, and other costs 
t hat are independent from user base or user behavior. This fixed 
cost captures a simple form of economies of scale, namely, the 
more subscribers (or remote traffic) , the less the per user (or 
per traffic volume) cost. The second component depends on the 
number of users , where n is the subscriber population size and 
Cm is t he management cost per additional subscriber ; the third 
and t he fourth components are the peering cost induced by the 
external traffic. On charging an access ISP for the transit ser-
vice, t he upper level ISPs compare the downlink traffic volume 
wit h up link traffic and charge the larger direction of traffic based 
on usage2 . Given the traffic assumption that downlink traffic is 
no smaller than uplink traffic , it means the peering cost depends 
on t he inbound traffic of an access ISP. The third component is 
t he peering cost induced by the inbound regular traffic. d de-
notes the average regular traffic. The P2P users would generate 
an ext ra P2P downloading traffic X , which contributes to the 
fourt h component. In this cost function and the following part, 
so as to mat ch the notations for the other parts of cost, we use 
Ct instead of Pt to denote the price a transit ISP charges for one 
unit of external traffic. 
D. User Behavior 
We introduce a ut ility function to describe users ' benefit from 
accessing t he Internet. The user 's utility is defined as the com-
bination of ut ility from regular usage and P2P usage. To focus 
on P 2P usage, we represent the utility from regular usage by an 
average value Ur, which is the same for all the users, and we 
2In real operation, transit ISP s take 5-minute samples of the traffic volume and charge 
based on the 95th percentile value, the higher of uplink and downlink. To simplify the cost 
function , we simply assume the payment is proportional to the traffic volume, the higher 
of uplink and downlink. 
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also denote users ' downloading volume of regular traffic by an 
average value d. This can be extended to other utility value or 
other downlink regular traffic. For the utility of P2P usage , we 
represent it as the following, 
Up(x) == u(x), x < x 
in which, x represents the volume of downloading P2P traf-
fic, and x denotes the maximum P2P traffic volume one user 
can download in a time unit when P2P usage incurs no extra 
charge. We denote by x users' P2P requirement. To represent 
users' variation on using P2P, x is modeled as a random vari-
able following an exponential distribution with parameter A. We 
make a further assumption that u(x) is a nondecreasing , con-
cave, continuously differentiable function , and u(O) == 0. As 
we have assumed, a user 's downloading volume of P2P traffic is 
identical to the uploading volume of P2P traffic , so x can repre-
sent either user's uploading or downloading P2P volume. When 
user i is charged in the uplink pricing way, his payoff function is 
(3 .5) 
in which Xi is user i's P2P usage. Given the price p and q, user 
i makes the decision of whether to subscribe to a network and 
how much P2P traffic to download (xi), based on the following 
constraints: 
• Optimality constraint: 
S(xi;p,q) > S(x;p,q),\fx # x; . 
• Rationality constraint: 
S(xi;p, q) > 0. 
• Feasibility constraint: 
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Given p and q, user i maximizes his payoff (3.5). The objective 
function (3.5) is obviously a concave function. Doing the first-
order derivative of the objective function, we have 
Let the above formulation to be zero, 
(3.6) 
and the solution is denoted by x. As the function u( x) is 
the same for all users , x is identical for users. Comparing x 
with users ' heterogeneous P2P requirement , we determine users' 
payoff-maximizing volume of P2P usage. 
• If x < 0, which means u'(O) - q < 0, then x; == 0. User i 
stops using P2P because P2P usage would incur reduction 
in payoff. 
• If 0 < x < xi, then x; == x. User i whose P2P requirement 
is larger than x lowers the downloading volume to x. 
• If x > xi, then x; == Xi· User i whose P2P requirement is 
smaller than x sticks to his original usage level. 
For the network, if S(x; p, q) < 0, which means even the opti-
mized payoff is negative, users would all leave the network. If 
S(x; p, q) > 0, the payoff is then to be checked to see whether 
x; satisfies the rationality constraint. 
For the case when x < 0, x; == 0 and the payoff is Ur - p. 
If Ur > p , user i would subscribe to the network but use no 
P2P ; otherwise, user i opts out. Therefore , if Ur > p, all users 
subscribe to the network because they could get non-negative 
payoffs with or without P2P requirement. Otherwise, users with 
small enough P2P requirement would gain negative payoffs and 
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opt out. In this case, there would be a threshold , users with 
P2P requirement smaller than which will leave the network. We 
denote this threshold by x1. 
We denote by x1 the rationality threshold and by x2 the opti-
mality threshold, in which x2 == x, if x > 0; and x2 == 0, if x < 0. 
The following proposition concludes users ' behavior when they 
are charged by uplink pricing with given price p and q. 
Proposition 3.2.1 Users are charged by uplink pricing. Price 
p and q are given) and x1 and x2 are determined. 
1. When x2 > 0 and S(x2 ; p, q) < 0) all the users leave the 
network. 
• If Xi < x1) user i leaves the network. 
• If x1 < Xi < x2) user i stays in the network and uses 
P2P at the volume of xi. 
• If Xi > x2 ) user i stays in the network and users P2P 
at the volume of x2. 




Then, the profit of ISP is 
u(xl) +UT- qx l , 
u' (x2 ). 
(3 .7) 
(3.8) 
To sum up, we list all the notations for our model in Table 3.2. 




















Total number of users in this market 
Total number of ISPs in this market 
Number of users in one ISP 
Fixed operation cost 
Marginal cost per additional subscriber 
Marginal cost per external traffic volume 
Subscription price under uplink pricing 
Flat-rate price for downlink traffic in uplink pricing 
Price for per uplink traffic volume in uplink pricing 
The charge per user under fiat- rate pricing 
The charge per unit of traffic under usage-based pricing 
The price the content ISP charges the content servers for per 
unit of traffic 
The price the transit ISP charges lower-level ISPs for per unit of 
traversing traffic. It is the same as Ct. 
Profit of ISP 
Average downlink regular traffic volume 
Fraction of inbound external regular traffic 
Fraction of inbound external P2P traffic 
Average utility from regular web services 
Utility gained from x volume of P2P downlink traffic 
Downlink P2P traffic volume 
P2P requirement 
The P2P traffic volume a user downloads to maximize his payoff 
Rationality threshold. Users with P2P requirement lower than 
x1 will leave the network. 
Optimality threshold. 
Total volume of downlink P2P traffic 
The discount factor in the repeated game 
The outbound traffic volume of one ISP 
The inbound traffic volume of one ISP 
Table 3.2: Notations 1 
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3.3 Uplink Pricing in a Competitive Market 
From ISPs' perspective, whether to adopt a new pricing strat-
egy depends on the possible outcome of this adoption, which 
depends on the action/strategy of other ISPs. When equilib-
rium strategies exist, they can help us understand the effects of 
uplink pricing. 
In this section, we are going to study the adoption of uplink 
pricing in a competitive market. We look at a specific case 
where the utility function is u( x) == w log(l + x), which obviously 
conforms to our assumption about the properties of u( x) . With 
this specific utility function, prices are related to thresholds as 
p 
q 
w log(l + i1) + Or - qi 1, 
w 
1 + i2 
(3.10) 
(3.11) 
To be precise, in the following sections we are going to remove 
the fixed cost Cf by assuming it is negligible compared to other 
costs. In practice, the assumption of negligible fixed cost may 
not be that unreasonable. The fixed costs may be reducible 
(making it almost a variable cost); and it may also be shared 
by other business operations, if the ISP is engaged in more than 
only data networking services. 
In the following part, we are going to explore the equilibrium 
of price setting after uplink pricing is introduced. Ur and w are 
two parameters identical for all users. Ur is one user 's utility 
from regular usage and w can be viewed as the marginal utility 
from P2P usage. Respectively, Ur can be larger or smaller than 
Cm+ Ctrrd, the cost induced by one user 's regular web usage, 
and w can be larger or smaller than Ctrp, the marginal cost 
induced by P2P traffic. Therefore, the following four cases are 
analyzed respectively. 
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Case 1: UT > Cm+ CtrTd, w > Ctrp 
Users ' utility from Internet services (P2P and non-P2P traffic) 
exceeds the cost incurred by their usage for ISPs; namely, the 
effort ISPs have put into providing services is recognized by users 
and users are willing to pay for the services they receive. In this 
setting , we prove the existence of a symmetric pure-strategy 
equilibrium of the pricing game among multiple ISPs. 
- -
Lemma 3.3.1 When UT > Cm+ CtrTd, w > Ctrp, there exists 
a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium that all ISPs adopt uplink 





The proof for Lemma 3.3.1 is similar to the one for Lemma 3.3.2 
(Appendix A.1) , but the latter one is more general, so we just 
omit the proof for Lemma 3.3.1 here. 
At the equilibrium presented in Lemma 3.3.1 , ISPs would get 
symmetric number of users and the distribution of users' P2P 
requirement i can be viewed as the same in all ISPs. In this 
price setting, the two thresholds are x1 == 0 and x2 == c·w. - 1. t7 p 
Therefore, ISPs grab all potential subscribers and the P2P usage 
is upper bounded by cw - 1. The profit of each ISP is zero. 
t T p 
- -
Case 2: U,. < Cm+ CtrTd, w > Ctrp 
Unlike Case (1) , in Case (2) users' utility from regular web us-
age is lower than the cost incurred by that usage. While utility 
from P2P usage still can compensate the cost for delivering P2P 
traffic. Lemma 3.3.2 demonstrates the equilibrium in this situ-
ation. 
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- -
Lemma 3.3.2 When Ur < Cm+ Ctrrd) w > Ctrp) there exists 
a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium that all ISPs adopt uplink 
pricing and the price setting is identically 
p* 
q* 
C,m + Ctrrd, 
Ctrp. 
Detailed proof is presented in Appendix A.1. 
(3 .14) 
(3.15) 
The equilibrium in Lemma 3.3.2 appears the same as the 
one in Lemma 3.3.1. However , at the former equilibrium, the 
rationality threshold x1 is positive , which means some users with 
lower P2P requirement do not subscribe to the network, because 
their loss of payoff in regular traffic cannot be made up by t he 
gain in P2P traffic. 
- -
Case 3: Ur >Cm+ Ctrrd, w < Ctrp 
This is an opposite case to Case (2): utility from regular traffic 
exceeds the cost induced but marginal utility from P2P traffic 
is lower than the marginal cost for delivering that traffic. 
Lemma 3.3.3 When Ur > Cm + Ctrrd) w < Ctrp) all ISPs 
adopt uplink pricing at equilibrium and the stable price setting 
'tS 
p* Cm + Ctrrd, 
q* > w. 
(3.16) 
(3 .17) 
Proof: If one ISP unilaterally decreases its charge for up-
link as lower than w but keeps price for downlink unchanged , 
it is straightforward that this ISP will run a deficit because t he 
charge from P2P usage cannot compensate the costs for deliv-
ering that traffic. 
An interesting question is that whether one ISP, say I S Pk, 
who charges a price qk lower than w but a price Pk higher than p*, 
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can get a positive profit. We assume that Pk ==Cm+ Ctrrd + 61. 
Let the optimality threshold of ISPk be xk2 , so x~ ~ w - 1 > 0. qk 
The rationality threshold in ISPk is denoted by x~. Any user 
whose P2P requirement is smaller than x~ will subscribe to ISPs 
other than ISPk. For the other users with requirements higher 
than x~, they compare their payoffs in different ISPs and make 
the decision of which ISP to subscribe to. When subscribing to 
any ISP other than IS Pk , the payoff just comes from regular 
usage 
- -
S_k == Ur - Cm- Ctrrd. (3.18) 
While the payoff of subscribing to IS Pk is 
Only when S_k < Sk will that user subscribe to ISPk, which 
also means when w log(l + x) - 61 - qkx > 0, that user will 
subscribe to ISPk. Therefore , the profit of ISPk is 
i in ISPk 
i in ISPk 
i in ISPk 
< 0 
Therefore , IS Pk cannot get a positive profit if it encourages P2P 
usage in this case. • 
At this equilibrium, x1 == x2 == 0. Intuitively, when users ' 
marginal utility from P2P usage cannot reach t he cost induced 
for delivering that P2P traffic, ISPs have the incentive to charge 
a sufficiently high price for uplink traffic , in order to block P2P 
traffic away. 
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Case 4: Ur <Cm+ Ctrrd, w < Ctrp 
In this situation, ISPs have only two options , (1) charge a higher 
price and lose all the users , (2) charge a lower price and run a 
deficit. When facing this kind of market where users' utility 
from network services is lower than the cost induced to provide 
those services, ISPs should improve their ability in satisfying 
users' requests by the local network so as to decrease rr and 
rp, consequently to decrease the operation cost. When t he cost 
decreases to a level that any of the previous cases is satisfied , 
ISPs could run their business then. 
Combing the above four cases, we reach the following propo-
sition. 
Proposition 3.3.4 When w > Ctrp) there exists a symmetric 
pure-strategy equilibrium that all ISPs adopt uplink pricing and 






When Ur > Cm+Ctrrd and w < Ctrp) there exists an equilibrium 
that all ISPs adopt uplink pricing and the price is set as 
p* Cm + Ctrrd , 




However) when Ur < Cm + Ctrrd and w < Ctrp) ISPs should cut 
their operation cost to maintain the business . 
3.4 The Cooperative Strategy with U plink 
Pricing 
In this section, we are going to explore the optimal cooperative 
strategy for all ISPs adopting uplink pricing. We simply define 
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t his cooperation as ISPs setting the same price to maximize 
t he total profit generated in this local market and obtaining 
equal part of the profit , though we are aware of other forms of 
cooperation like setting different prices and directly paying each 
other money as a profit return. 
3.4.1 The Cooperative Case 
We continue using p and q to denote respectively the fixed rate 
price for downlink and the volume-based price for uplink. Sim-






Recall that x1 is the turnover point of subscribing to the net-
work or not and x2 is the upper-bound limiting per user's P2P 
downloading volume. According to the user behavior described 
in P roposition 3.2.1 , we formulate the total profit generated in 
t his local market when all ISPs adopt uplink pricing and set the 
price as p and q. 
P == N P(x > x1) (p- Cm - Ctrrd) + X(q- Ctrp), 
in which 
X== N P(x > x2) x2 + N P(x1 < x < x2)E(xix1 < x < £2). 
After some derivation, we have 
p N e-Ai 1 (P- Cm - Ctrrd) 
1 AA 1 AA + N(q- Ctrp )((Xl + )e- x , - ,\ e- x2 ). 
Applying (3. 24) and (3.25) , we have 
p N e- AXl ( w log(1 + xl) - CtrpXl + Ur -Cm- Ctrrd) 
1 w \ A \ A + N _ ( _ c r ) ( e- A X 1 _ e- A X 2) 
A 1 + £2 t P ' (3.26) 
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ISPs can optimize their profit by choosing XI and x2 . We 
formulate the following optimization problem 
s.t. XI< X2 (3.27) 
XI> 0, X2 > 0 
Doing the first-order partial derivative of P over XI and x2 re-
spectively, we have 
e--\£1 (A( CtrpXI - w log(1 + xi) - Ur - C,m - CtrTd) 
w w 
+ 1 A - 1 A ) (3.28) 
+XI + X2 
w 1 \ ft \ ft 
-----(e-/\xl - e-/\x2) (1 + x2)2 A 
+ ( w - C r )e--\£2 (3.29) 
1 + x2 t P 
Case 1: w < Ctrp 
When w < Ctrp, which means users' marginal utility from P2P 
usage is smaller than the marginal cost induced by P2P traffic , 
according to (3.29) , it follows that Z~ < 0. Therefore, the opti-
mal value of x2 is set to be XI· We equate x2 to XI in (3.26) and 
have 
P == N e--\£1 ( w log(1 + xi) - Ctr pXI + UT - Cm - CtrTd)(3.30) 
It is obvious that when w < Ctrp , Z~ < 0, so P reaches its 
maximum point when XI == x2 == 0. As a result, the optimal 
price setting should be 
{ 
p* == Ur 
q* > w 
The total profit in this local market is 
P == N(Ur - Cm - CtrTd), 
CHA PTER 3. UPLINK PRICING 43 
which is nonnegative if Ur > Cm +Ctrrd, and negative otherwise. 
T wo implications can be perceived from the cooperative strategy 
in this case. 
1. W hen w < Ctrp and Ur > Cm+ Ctrrd , compared to the 
same case in competitive situation, ISPs can get a higher 
profit by cooperation as expected. Besides, like Case (3) 
in competitive market , ISPs choose to charge a sufficiently 
high price for uplink traffic to block P2P. 
- -
2. W hen w < Ctrp and Ur < Cm+ Ctrrd, cooperation between 
ISPs still cannot save ISPs ' business. ISPs have to pursue 
improvement in t echnology to reduce the operation cost. 
Case 2: 'W > Ctrp 
When user 's marginal utility from P2P is no smaller than the 
marginal cost s P2P traffic could incur , the optimization problem 
becomes much more complicated and seems intractable, so we 
are going t o find some insights through numerical results. In 
finding the numerical results , the default value we use are: N == 
- -
1, Ur == 2, Cm + Ctrrd == 1, w == 1, Ctrp == 0.5. We vary A, 
t he parameter for distribution of P2P requirement, from 0.1 to 
1. The following figures (Fig. 3.4) illustrate the optimal price 
setting to maximize total profit as A increases, the according 
threshold pair (xi , x2) and ISPs ' profit as well. 
We make t he following observations _from the figures: 
• As we increases A, the turnover point xi and the price for 
downlink traffic p* decrease. We have assumed the dis-
tribut ion of users' P2P requirement follows an exponential 
distribut ion , so larger A means more users assemble at lower 
P 2P requirement region and the average P2P requirement 
is smaller . Therefore , when A increases, p* is decreased to 
grab those users with smaller P2P requirement , otherwise 
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(c) The profit each ISP could obtain as A changes 
Figure 3.4: Optimal cooperative strategy and profit 
ISPs would lose too many users to obtain an optimal profit. 
Especially when A increases to a certain level, x1 goes down 
to zero to admit all the users into the network. After that , 
p* would not change and it is equal to Ur. 
• As we increase A, the price for uplink traffic q* increases to 
reach the optimality. As A increases , more people assemble 
at the lower P2P requirement region , so if q* is increased 
moderately, only a smaller part of subscribers would re-
duce their P2P usage , therefore the total volume of P2P 
usage would not decrease too much. Meanwhile , as ISPs 
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increase the price q* , the per-volume profit would be in-
creased. Therefore , the total profit (per-volume profit times 
tot al volume) after increasing q* would be higher than not 
increasing it . 
Part icularly, compared to the part where XI is zero, q* in-
creases more rapidly before xi hits zero. This is because 
in t he first half part , as A increases, xi goes down to at-
t ract the users with smaller P2P requirement (Fig. 3.4(c)), 
which makes the average P2P requirement decrease even 
more sharply. Therefore , q* is increased more rapidly to in-
crease the per-volume profit so as to get an optimal profit. 
While after XI hits zero , the user number is fixed, so the 
change of average P2P requirement is only related to A and 
it is less rapid compared to the first half part , therefore, q* 
increases less rapidly. 
As q* == I_;x2, x2 decreases as A increases , and it decreases 
more rapidly in the first half part. 
• It can be seen from Fig. 3.4( c) that the profit each ISP 
could obtain t hrough cooperation decreases as A increases, 
which means if the P2P requirement in this market is smaller, 
the profit one ISP could gain with optimal strategy would 
be smaller. The reason is because when P2P requirement 
decreases, users ' utility from P2P usage would also de-
crease, so t he utility that could be "squeezed" out by co-
operative ISPs get s smaller. 
3.4.2 The Threat Strategy 
Analysis shows that ISPs can obtain a higher profit through co-
operation compared to the profit under competition (Fig. 3.4( c)). 
However , there is no incentive for ISPs to cooperate. Some 
threat strategy is applicable here to encourage the cooperation. 
CHAPTER 3. UPLINK PRICING 46 
We denote the cooperation strategy described in previous part 
by Scooperate and denote the strategy described in Proposition 
3.3.4 by Sthreat· The pricing game is viewed as an infinitely re-
peated game with many stages, at which each ISP evaluates its 
own profit, reviews others ' strategies , and adjusts its strategy if 
necessary. The following proposition states the subgame-perfect 
equilibrium of this game. 
Proposition 3.4.1 The strategy profile "Play S cooperate until some 
ISP deviates and play Sthreat since then)) is a subgame-perfect 
equilibrium for the repeated pricing game among these ISPs un-
der the condition that 
1 ()>1--
M' 
in which () is the discount factor of the repeated game. 
(3.31) 
Discount factor is a critical factor in the theory of repeated 
game. This discount factor represents the rate of inflation that 
makes future profit less valuable when compared to current re-
turns. The equilibrium of a repeated game requires comparing 
two strategies involving future profits as well as current returns , 
so it is necessary to include this factor in the comparison. 
Proposition 3.4.1 implies that whether the proposed strategy 
is a subgame-perfect equilibrium or not depends on the discount 
fact (), which is explicitly negatively related to the number of 
ISPs in the market. In reality, the discount factor is fairly fixed 
in the short run, so if the number of ISPs increases, (1 - ~) 
might get so large that () cannot catch up with it, and the con-
dition (3.31) fails, then the proposed strategy profile would be no 
longer subgame perfect. As cooperation can bring ISPs higher 
profit, one possible way to encourage cooperation is that some 
large companies take over small companies to decrease the num-
ber of ISPs in the market to the extent that condition (3 .31 ) can 
be satisfied. At that time it will be less beneficial to break the 
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cooperation agreement , so all the ISPs can be expected to stay 
in the cooperative agreement and get a higher profit. 
3.5 Further Discussion 
3.5.1 Accounting Cost 
In the above analysis , the management cost in ISPs' cost func-
t ion is always assumed to be identical in both flat-rate pricing 
and uplink pricing. In fact ,we should not neglect the extra cost 
incurred by the measurement of traffic volume. This account-
ing cost consists of the cost for the measurement devices, the 
extra dat abase to store users ' volume record , etc.. "fo address 
t his fact or , we assume that with the adoption of uplink pricing, 
t he management cost per user is increased by Ca , which denotes 
t he accounting cost per user. Therefore, when adopting uplink 
pricing, ISPs cost function becomes 
(3.32) 
in which n is the number of subscribers inside this network, and 
X is t he total P2P traffic volume. 
The incorporation of accounting cost does not affect the co-
operation strat egy a lot , since we just need to substitute the 
original Cm with Cm + Ca, and carry out the same derivation. 
However the non-cooperative equilibrium is no longer what it 
used to be. Uplink pricing may be too costly to implement if 
the accounting cost is considerable compared to the peering cost. 
Normally accounting cost Ca depends on the latest technology, 
and it is not related to users ' behavior. Therefore , if the peer-
ing cost for P2P in the market is relatively small , it would be 
nonprofitable to invest money for adopting uplink pricing and 
flat-rate pricing is favorable; while if the peering cost induced 
by P 2P is considerable in the network, ISPs would be better off 
by adopting uplink pricing. 
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3.5.2 Peer-to-Peer Locality 
Most P2P applications nowadays are designed to pick up peers 
randomly from the neighbor list that trackers have provided. 
This randomness on the one hand balances the traffic flow among 
the Internet, but on the other hand also leads to insufficient use 
of local sources and considerable peering cost. 
With the uplink pricing policy, users are charged based on 
their P2P usage volume, which would inevitably decrease their 
P2P usage. This might be a bad news for the P2P application 
developers. However, if P2P software are designed to be more 
ISP-friendly, which means the fraction of external P2P traffic 
is much smaller than now, ISPs' peering cost is expected to 
decline. Once the peering cost is lower , the usage-based part q 
of uplink pricing will go down accordingly. As a result , lower 
q will lead to higher users ' P2P usage , which is also better for 
P2P application developers ' business. 
To sum up, if uplink pricing is adopted by all the ISPs , there 
should be incentive for P2P software designers to improve the 
P2P locality when designing the applications. 
3.6 Related Works 
Many researchers have worked on the pricing policies inside the 
Internet industry, but as this industry involves so many stake 
holders and thus the complicated relationship in between, re-
searchers mostly focused on part of the relationship. 
[21] demonstrates a solid analysis over the interaction among 
ISPs, and figures out how the retail ISPs would behave on set-
ting prices for access services , how the backbone ISPs choose 
the price for transit services, and how ISPs would decide on 
peering. This paper covers the three levels of backbone ISPs , 
access ISPs and end-users, but ignores the content providers and 
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t he influence content would have on ISPs' behavior. [10] makes 
up wit h this part. It reveals how the profit should be reallo-
cated between content ISP and "eyeball" ISP linking together. 
Besides, quite a lot of papers have worked on the peering rela-
t ionship between ISPs , focusing on different aspects of this issue 
[6 , 8, 17, 23 , 26 , 28], whether two ISPs should peer , how they 
should peer , whether they should set a " bill-and-keep" peer-
ing contact or a normal peering with mutual payment , how the 
payment is decided , etc .. A great part of the papers mentioned 
above have examined the general case in Internet industry. With 
t he development of P2P technology, researchers might need to 
incorporat e the P2P factor into the study on Internet pricing. 
[26] t hen has worked on the peering relationship when P2P traf-
fic is taken into account . 
3. 7 Concluding Remarks 
Recent reports and studies have apparently shown that Internet 
Service P roviders are under a dilemma on how to view P2P 
traffic and make it controllable. The pervasion of P2P being 
wider makes ISPs more conscious before carrying out any new 
policy related t o P2P applications , otherwise users might be 
bothered and ISPs' own business is ruined at the same time. 
We believe in current Internet where P2P traffic dominates, a 
targeted pricing policy could help resolve the conflict between 
ISPs and P2P t raffic. -
In t his chapter , we took a game-theoretic approach towards 
examining t he effect of uplink pricing on ISPs ' business and 
the whole Internet market. Results arising from the analysis 
show that uplink pricing can be adopted by all the ISPs at the 
equilibrium in a competitive market. It is also proven that ISPs 
can get higher profit by cooperation, and some threat strategy is 
presented to encourage such cooperation. We also present a nice 
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demonstration that uplink pricing can be treated as a promising 
method on triggering the development of P2P technology. 
D End of chapter. 
Chapter 4 
Viability of Paris Metro Pricing 
Paris Metro Pricing is borrowed from the charging scheme im-
posed on Paris metro, where carriages are classified into higher-
class and regular-class and different classes of carriages are charged 
different prices. Paris Metro Pricing in Internet partitions the 
whole network capacity into several virtual channels and im-
poses different prices for different channels. The expectation 
for Paris Metro Pricing is that higher-priced channels seize less 
users, therefore perform higher level of quality-of-service com-
pared to lower-priced channels. Paris Metro Pricing realizes a 
simple form of differentiated service pricing. 
Whether Paris Metro Pricing could bring higher profit for 
a monopolist or bring better social welfare for social planners 
has been intensively studied [2 , 5, 7, 20]. [5] also contributes in 
examining the adoption of Paris Metro Pricing in a competitive 
market. Interestingly, with different models , [7] and [20] reach 
different conclusions about whether Paris Metro Pricing could 
bring higher profit for a monopolist, compared to one-class fiat-
rate pricing. 
In both [2] and [5], it has been proven that when the quality-
of-service( QoS) function satisfies some constraints , ISPs could 
get a higher profit by differentiating the prices of two channels 
than assigning the same prices for them. Besides , for a social 
planner, identical pricing for both channels is always inferior to 
51 
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differentiated pricing, in terms of social welfare. However, there 
is no reason to argue that imposing p on the network could bring 
the same profit or social welfare as partitioning the network 
into two virtual channels and imposing p identically on them. 
Therefore , to compare one-channel flat-rate pricing with Paris 
Metro Pricing, it is urgent to clarify the relationship between 
one-channel flat-rate pricing and two-channel identical pricing. 
Our major contributions in this chapter include determining 
the sufficient conditions under which there is a gap between one 
network with price p and two virtual channels with identical 
price p, as well as providing explanations for the opposite results 
in [7] and [20]. The following parts are organized as follows: In 
Section 4.1 , we develop a simple model to describe the problem. 
In Section 4.2 , we further analyze the model to characterize the 
gap between one network with price p and two virtual channels 
with identical price p. Case studies are carried out in Section 
4.3 to explain the reason why the two papers [7] and [20] find 
opposite results. Finally, we summarize this chapter. 
4.1 The Model 
We build a similar model to the one in [2]. We consider the 
scenario where one monopolist ISP possesses a total capacity of 
C, and users in the market have different preferences for qual-
ity of service. The preference is characterized by (), which is a 
random variable at the region of [~, ()], following the probability 
distribution function f ( ()) (and also the cumulative distribution 
function F( ())). The network quality of service is described by 
a function K ( C , J) , which is related to the network capacity 
C and user demand J. The user demand J can be either user 
number inside the network or packet arrival rate at the entrance 
of t he network, depending on the granularity of the model. If 
t he ISP divides the capacity into m channels, then K(Ci, Ji) 
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Symbol Explanation 
c Capacity of the network 
ci Capacity of channel i 
B· J User j's preference on quality of service 
K(C, J) Quality-of-service function when network capacity is C and user 
demand is J 
p Price vector charged over all channels 
Pi Price charged for channel i 
J User demand , can be either user number or packet arrival rate 
Ji User demand in channel i 
Jf Total user demand with flat-rate pricing 
Rt Total revenue with flat-rate pricing 
Wt Social welfare with flat-rate pricing 
J2c Total user demand with two-channel identical pricing 
R2c Total revenue with two-channel identical pricing 
W2c Social welfare with two-channel identical pricing 
Table 4.1: Notations 2 
denotes the quality of service of channel i and Pi denotes the 
price imposed on class i. We look at a certain class of functions 
K(C, J), which subject to the following constraints: 
1. K ( C, J) is positive, strictly increasing with C , strictly de-
creasing with J and differentiable; 
2. There exists a permutation of (1 , ... , m) , say (x 1, ... , Xrn) , 
such that l x1 > · · · > l xm ===} k(Cx1 , l x1 ) < · · · < k(Cxm' l xm ) 
and k denotes the partial derivative of K over J. 
The first constraint implies the nature of quality of service. The 
quality of service would be better if the capacity is larger or the 
user demand is lower. The second constraint eliminates those 
irregular QoS functions. 
Given the set of QoS functions over all channels {K(Ci, Ji)}, 
users' preference () and the price vector p == {Pl , P2, ... , Pm} , 
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user j's utility function in channel i would be 
( 4.1) 
Table 4.1 sums up all the notations used in this model and the 
following analysis. 
4.2 Flat-rate Pricing versus Paris Metro Pric-
. 1ng 
When ISPs make decisions on which pricing policy to adopt, 
profitability is one of the most important factors to evaluate. 
While from a social planner 's point view, social welfare is the 
first priority. Therefore , on examining the viability of Paris 
Metro Pricing, revenue and social welfare are both addressed. 
We explicitly split the comparison between one-channel flat-rate 
pricing and Paris Metro Pricing into two steps: (1) comparing 
one-channel flat-rate pricing with two-channel identical pricing; 
(2) comparing two-channel identical pricing with two-channel 
differentiated pricing. The second step has been well studied in 
[2]. It is proven that compared to two-channel identical pricing, 
ISPs can always get better revenue and social planners can al-
ways achieve higher social welfare by differentiating the prices 
for those two channels, under the condition that QoS function 
K ( C, J) satisfies the constraints in previous section. However, 
as to our knowledge, no past literature has ever studied the first 
step explicitly. Therefore, in this section, we first study the 
change of revenue and social welfare as the network is parti-
tioned into two channels and the channels are priced identically. 
Then we combine the two steps together to reach a conclusion 
on the comparison between flat-rate pricing and Paris Metro 
Pricing. 
CHAPTER 4. VIABILITY OF PARIS METRO PRICING 55 
4.2.1 One-channel Flat-rate Pricing 
Consider the scenario where one ISP charges each subscriber a 
fiat-rate price p and the capacity of the network is C , then only 
the users whose utility is non-negative would subscribe to the 
network. That is 
so we have 
A 
Let J be the potential user demand in the market , then 
A p 
JP(BJ > K(C, JJ)) = Jf , (4 .2) 
in which Jf denotes total user demand. 
Lemma 4.2.1 There is a unique solution Jf for the equation 
(4.2). 
Proof: The right side of ( 4.2) is strictly increasing with Jf 
and the left side is strictly decreasing with Jf. When Jf == 0, 
the left side is positive and the right side is zero , while when Jf 
goes to infinity, the left side goes to zero but the right side goes 
to infinity, therefore there must a unique intersection between 
those two curves. • 
The revenue of the ISP is 
(4.3) 
and the social welfare is 
W1 = J iJ v BK(C, J1 )J(B)dB 
K (C, Jj ) 
(4 .4) 
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4.2.2 Two-Channel Identical Pricing 
Let us assume the ISP partitions the whole capacity into two 
channels, with capacity Ca and C(1-a) respectively, and charges 
both channels the price p as in one-channel flat-rate pricing. 
Lemma 4.2.2 The quality of service at equilibrium is the same 
for both channels) which means the following equation holds 
(4.5) 
where Ji denotes user demand in channel i at equilibrium. 
Proof: Suppose that ( 4.5) does not hold at equilibrium, with-
out loss of generality, we assume 
then there is always incentive for users in channel 2 to switch 
to channel 1. As users transferring from channel 2 to channel 1, 
K(Ca , 11 ) decreases and K(Ca , 12 ) increases. Eventually, the 
equilibrium is reached when the quality of service is the same in 
both channels. • 
If we denote the total user demand in this two-channel case 
as J2c, then 
(4.6) 
The revenue in this case is 
and the social welfare is 
W2c = je BK(Ca, J1)J(B)dB 
K(Ca. ,J 1 ) 
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4.2.3 Flat-rate Pricing versus Two-Channel Identical 
Pricing 
Let Re be the revenue gap , the difference on revenue between the 
above two cases, and let Rw be the welfare gap , the difference 
on social welfare. Therefore, 
Re== R1- R2c, 
We== Wf- W2c· 
The following proposition characterizes the above gaps with dif-
ferent types of QoS functions. 
Proposition 4.2.3 The relationship between QoS function K( C , J) 
and performance gaps le , We is shown as follows: 
1. K(C{3 , 1{3) == K(C, J), Vf3 > 0 
====> Re == 0, We == 0. 
2. K(C{3 , 1{3) > K(C, J) , when {3 > 1, Vf3 > 0 
====> Re> 0, We > 0. 
3. K(C{3, 1{3) < K(C, J) , when {3 > 1, Vf3 > 0 
====> Re< 0, We < 0. 
Proof: For one-channel flat-rate pricing case , Jf is the solution 
of the following equation 
(4.7) 
For two-channel identical pricing case, 11 and 12 are the solution 
of the following equation groups 
{ 
K(Ca , J1) A K(C(l- Pa), J2) 
J1 + J2 == JP( ()j > K(Ca ,J1)) 
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If the QoS function satisfies the condition that K ( C f3, 
1{3 ) == K(C, 1) , V/3 > 0, then we have 
11 . 12 
K (Co: , Jl) = K(C, ~) = K(C(l- o:), J2) = K(C, (l _ o:)). 
It follows that 
Therefore, 
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11 A p A p 
12c == 11+12 ==- = JP(eJ > K(C J )) = JP(BJ > J
1 
). 
a a, 1 K(C,-;;) 
Lemma 4.2.1 makes sure that 1! == ~ , so 1! == 12c, and Rj == 
R 2c · Similarly, we have Wf == W2c · 
If t he QoS function satisfies the condition that K(C/3 , 1{3) > 
K(C, 1 ), when f3 > 1, V/3 > 0, and if we assume a> 0.5 without 
loss of generality, then we have 
11(1-a) K (C(1- a), 12) == K(Ca , 11 ) > K(C(1- a), ), 
a 
As K (C, 1) is decreasing with 1 , it follows that 12 < 11 (1-a), so J a 
12c == 11 + 1 2 < ; . Therefore , 
Then , we have that 
A p A p 
J2c = JP(BJ > K(C J )) < JP(BJ > K(C J / 
a, 1 ' 2c 
It fo llows t hat 12c < 1!. As a result , we have R2c < Rf and 
W 2c < Wf . 
Similar analysis could also find that if K ( C f3 , 1 {3) < K ( C, 1) , 
when (3 > 1, \/(3 > 0, then R2c > Rj and W2c > Wf. 
• 
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• If user demand is interpreted as number of subscribers in 
the network, Proposition 4.2.3 implies that as long as the 
QoS function is solely dependent on ) , namely per-user 
bandwidth, switching from one-channel pricing to two-channel 
identical pricing incurs no gap on revenue or social welfare. 
However, if users with the same per-user bandwidth prefer 
larger networks , which captures positive network externali-
ties, partitioning network would cause degradation on rev-
enue as well as social welfare; otherwise, revenue and social 
welfare would increase after capacity partition. 
• Let the user demand be the packet arrival rate at the en-
trance of network, it is found that when packets merely 
evaluate congestion from the busy probability of the net-
work, there would be no gap between one-channel flat-rat e 
pricing and two-channel identical pricing. However , given 
the same busy probability, if packets prefer higher service 
rate to lower service rate , which is similar to the case when 
congestion is evaluated from the average response time, rev-
enue and social welfare get worse after channel partitioning. 
4.2.4 Flat-rate Pricing versus Paris Metro Pricing 
In [2], Chau presents solid analysis on comparing two-channel 
identical pricing to two-channel differentiated pricing. It is proven 
that differentiated pricing could always reach higher revenue and 
social welfare. Combining the result in [2] with our findings in 
Proposition 4.2.3, we reach the following corollary. 
Corollary 4.2.4 For one QoS function K(C, J) , 
• If K(C{J , Jf3) == K(C, J), \1{3 > 0, or K(C{J, J {J) < K (C, J) , 
when f3 > 1, \1{3 > 0, Paris Metro Pricing could always 
bring higher revenue for a monopolist and higher social wel-
fare for a social planner. 
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• If K(Cf3, J f3 ) > K(C, J), when {3 > 1, \/{3 > 0, it is possi-
ble that Paris Metro Pricing cannot help in getting higher 
revenue or higher social welfare. 
In corollary 4.2.4, we provide the sufficient conditions under 
which Paris Metro Pricing is viable compared to flat-rate pricing. 
We also suggest the condition which probably leads to worse 
performance with Paris Metro Pricing. Further studies could 
focus on exploring the sufficient conditions under which Paris 
Metro Pricing is not viable. 
4.3 Case Studies 
Two of the former papers also study the viability of Paris Metro 
Pricing compared to flat-rate pricing [7], [20] . In both papers, 
congestion functions are specified and the utility functions of 
users are in the following form 
(4.8) 
which is slightly different from our definition ( 4.1). In ( 4.8), 
V denotes the benefit one user could get from this network, 
ej denotes users' congestion sensitivity, and K' is a congestion 
function which is strictly increasing with the user demand Ji. 
As a matter of fact , these two utility functions are compatible, 
since either V -ejK'(Ci, Ji) or ()jK(Ci, Ji) can represent the net 
benefit. Besides , in (4.8), higher ej means lower delay sensitivity 
or lower QoS preference, while in ( 4.8), higher ej means higher 
QoS preference. 
Case 1: K(C, J) ==V -~ 
In [7], K' ( Ci, J,i) == ~:, so we can convert the utility function 
1n [7] into U1(ej,i) == ej(V- ~:)-pi, which is in the form 
of ( 4.1) . Therefore, the QoS function is K ( C, J) == V - ~. 
CHAPTER 4. VIABILITY OF PARIS METRO PRICING 61 
It is straightforward that this function satisfies the constraint 
(1). If we divide the whole capacity into two channels, Co: and 
C(l- o:) (o: > 0.5), then the QoS function for each channel is 
K1 ( J1) == V- t~ and K2 ( J2) == V- c(f:_a). Doing the first-order 
derivative of K over J, we find k1 == - da and k2 == - C(l~a), 
so k1 > k2 for all J1 , J2 . Therefore, this specific QoS function 
conform to our constraint (2). According to [2], with this QoS 
function, a monopolist could get a higher profit by differentiating 
the prices for both channels. 
Furthermore, the function K ( C , J) is only related to ~ , so ac-
cording to Corollary 4.2.4, with this QoS function , a monopolist 
could gain higher profit with Paris Metro Pricing than with one-
channel fiat-rate pricing. This conclusion matches the numerical 
results presented in [7]. 
Case 2: K(C, J) ==V- c~J 
Similarly, we can convert the utility function in [20] into U2 ( ()j , i) 
== Bj(V- ci ~ 1i ) -Pi, so the case in [20] applies another QoS 
function K ( C, J) == V- C~J. We could check that this function 
conforms to our constraints for QoS functions , so with such a 
function, a monopolist could get higher revenue through differ-
entiating the prices for different classes. 
Closer examination finds that K(C{3, J {3 ) > K(C, J) , when 
{3 > 1, \1{3 > 0, so with such form of QoS function, corollary 
4.2.4 suggests that Paris Metro Pricing probably brings lower 
profit for the monopolist. The numerical results in [20] validate 
our conjecture. 
Based on the above case studies, we argue that different forms 
of QoS functions (or congestion functions) is the key factor that 
leads to the opposite conclusions about the profitability of Paris 
Metro Pricing in [7] and [20]. 
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4.4 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we explicit ly split the study on viability of Paris 
Metro P ricing into two st eps: from one-channel flat-rate pric-
ing to two-channel identical pricing, then to two-channel dif-
ferent iated pricing. Most of the past literature either solely 
study t he second step [2], [5] or directly compare one-channel 
flat-rate pricing wit h two-channel differentiat ed pricing [7], [20]. 
Our contribut ion is to charact erize the performance gap between 
one-channel flat-rate pricing and two-channel identical pricing. 
Combined wit h the work in [2], we also present some preliminary 
results about t he viability of Paris Metro Pricing. It is found 
that only when t he QoS functions satisfy some constraints will 
the Paris Metro Pricing bring higher revenue and higher social 
welfare , otherwise it is possible that Paris Metro Pricing could 
not help. 
D End of ch apter. 
Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
The Internet pricing problem- how ISPs charge the subscribers 
for the Internet access services to better utilize capacity re-
sources and earn higher profit - is an important problem in the 
commercialized Internet industry. In this thesis , we present our 
work on this problem. 
When you talk to people who work for ISPs, large or small , 
you quickly realize that all ISPs are grappling with the P2P 
problem, which ironically is also an opportunity to ISPs as P2P 
can be viewed as a renewed content provider technology. ISPs 
have tried different methods , such as P2P traffic blocking, and 
rate limiting, which sometimes have led to negative sentiments 
by their customers. In the first part of this thesis, we revisit 
pricing as a possible mechanism to manage ISP networks in 
the P2P era. We suggest a usage-based uplink pricing, which 
imposes an extra usage-based charge on users ' uplink traffic . 
Game-theoretic analysis is taken to examine the adoption of 
uplink pricing in the competitive case as well as the coopera-
tive case. Results arising from analysis show that uplink pricing 
could be adopted by all ISPs in competition. It is also proven 
that cooperation could bring higher profit for ISPs and a threat 
strategy could encourage such cooperation. Further discussions 
find that when the accounting cost to measure users ' usage is 
considerable , flat-rate pricing would outperform uplink pricing 
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in the competitive case. We also argue that uplink pricing could 
trigger the improvement of P2P technology in utilizing local re-
sources . 
The other part of this thesis is a study about the viability of 
Paris Metro Pricing. We build a simple model to evaluate the 
gap on revenue and social welfare between one-channel flat-rate 
pricing and two-channel identical pricing. In particular, it is 
found t hat the gap is tightly related to the forms of quality-of-
service functions. Combined with former results in [2] , we argue 
t hat only if QoS functions satisfy some constraints , Paris Metro 
Pricing could bring higher revenue and social welfare. Finally, 
we also provide an explanation of the opposite results on the 
profitability of Paris Metro Pricing in [7] and [20]. 
D End of chapter. 
Appendix A 
Equation Derivation 
A.l Proof for Lemma 3.3.2 
Proof: We first prove that if all ISPs adopt uplink pricing, p* 
and q* is the stable price setting. We need to show that no ISP 
can get higher profit by deviating from this price setting. At 
this price setting, the two thresholds are involved as 
p* 
q* 
w log(l + £1) + Ur- q£1 
w 
1 + £2 
Without loss of generality, we assume that IS Pk deviates 
from this price setting. It is straightforward that IS Pk cannot 
get a better profit by increasing or decreasing the price of only 
one link. For example, if Qk == q* - 6 and Pk == p* , it is obvious 
that IS Pk can attract all the users because of its lower price 
but get a negative profit; while if ISPk merely increases q* a 
little, it would definitely lose all the users. Therefore, the way of 
deviation that is more likely to bring higher profit is to increase 
the price for one link and decrease the other. 
Case 1 
The number of users admitted is kept unchanged , but the 
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price for uplink is decreased and the price for downlink is in-
creased. In other words, Qk == q* - b and x1 is kept unchanged. 
In this situation, x2 is changed to 
"'' w 1 x2 == .r - . q*- u 
As x1 is unchanged, 
Pk == w log(1 + xl) +Or- QkXl == p* + bxl. 
\!\Then there is one ISP charging in a different way from the 
others , users would evaluate their payoffs in each ISP and choose 
the one that brings the highest payoff. 
(1) For the user i that x1 < xi < x2, he can download P2P 
traffic at the volume of Xi in all ISPs but its payoff in IS Pk 
and the other ISPs might be different. We use Sf to denote the 
payoff of user i in IS Pk and si-k to denote the payoff of user i 
in ISPs other than IS Pk. 
Sf == W log(1 +Xi)+ Or- (Pk + QkXi), 
s i-k == w log(1 +Xi)+ Or- (p* + q*xi)· 
Comparing the profit , we have 
s:- si-k == b(xi- x1) > o. 
Therefore , user i would subscribe to ISPk. 
(2) For the user i that x2 < Xi < ~~' it can download volume 
xi in IS Pk but download volume x2 in the other ISPs. 
Sf == W log(1 +Xi) + Or - (Pk + QkXi) 
s i-k == w log(1 + x2) +Or- (p* + q*x2) 
Comparing the profit , we have 
sk - s~k 
'i ~ > ( w log(1 + x2) +Or - (Pk + QkX2)) - (si-k) 
(p* - Pk) + (q*- qk)x2 (A.1) 
-bx1 + bx2 > o (A.2) 
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(3) For the user i that xi > x~, it can download volume x; in 
ISPk but x2 in the other ISPs. Similarly, we compare the user 's 
payoff in different ISPs and we have 
s~ - s-:-k > o 
~ ~ -
Combining the above three items together , we can conclude that 
when ISPk deviates by setting a lower price than q* and keeping 
x1 unchanged , it can obtain all the users. In this situation, its 
profit is 
Pk == N e-Ax1 (Pk - Cm - Ctrrd) 
+N(e-A;~;~ + ( ~ + X1)e-Ai 1 - ( ~ + ;~)e-A;;)(qk - Ctrp) 
A A 
= N~(e-AX1 - e-A;~)(-0) < 0 A . 
Therefore, in this way of deviation, ISPk gets a worse profit. 
Case 2 
IS Pk sets a lower price for up link, Qk == q* - 6, and increases 
the price for downlink in the way so that x1 decreases. If we 
denote the rationality threshold in IS Pk by x~ , we have , 
In this case , 
Pk- p* < 6x~. 
Applying the methodology in Case (1) , we manage to prov that 
all the users would subscribe to ISPk but the ISPk's profit is 
still negative. 
Case 3 
If ISPk sets a lower price for uplink Qk == q*- 6 and increases 
the price for downlink in the way so that 
x1 < x~ < x2 < x;. 
APPENDIX A. EQUATION DERIVATION 68 
Therefore 
(A.3) 
For one user i, if x1 <Xi < x~, he does not subscribe to ISPk. 
If x~ < xi < x2 , similar to previous analysis, user i could 
download xi in all ISPs. User i would subscribe to IS Pk is 
It follows that 
* ~ Pk- P 
Xi > b 
Clearly Pk5P* > x~. If Pk5P* < x2, then users who satisfy that 
Pk5P* <xi < x2 would subscribe to ISPk. If xi> x2, the payoff 
of user i in ISPk continues increasing until x2 hits x;, but the 
payoff of user i in ISP_k would remain as when usage is x2 . 
Therefore , users who satisfy Xi > x2 subscribe to ISPk. To sum 
* 
up , users who satisfy xi > Pk5P subscribe to ISPk. We could 
calculate the profit of ISPk, 
However , if Pk5P* > x2, then users who satisfy x~ < Xi < x2 
do not subscribe to ISPk. We further examine the users with 
higher P2P requirement to see whether they would subscribe to 
IS Pk. For user i, if x2 < x,i < x;, he could download xi in IS Pk 
but £2 in ISP_k · Therefore, 
('w log(l +xi ) - Pk - qkxi) - ( w log(l + x2) - p* - q*x2) 
( w log(l + xi ) - qkxi) - ( w log(l + x2 ) - q*i2) - (Pk - p*) 
('w log( l + xi ) - q*xi) - ( w log(l + x2 ) - q*x2) - (Pk- p*) + bxi 
- 61 - (Pk- p*) + bxi, 
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in which -~1 < 0 denotes the negative value of (w log(l +x,i) -
q*xi)- ( w log(l + x2)- q*x2). It follows that when Sk- S_k > 0, 
x· > Pk-p*+~l If Pk-p*+t:q < x' then users who satisfy X~. > ~ 0 . 0 - 2' ~ 
Pk-P;+~ 1 would subscribe ISPk. Similarly, we could formulate 
the profit of IS Pk and prove that it is negative. 
If Pk-P;+~l > x~, we know that users who satisfy x,i < x; 
do not subscribe to ISPk. For users with higher P2P require-
ment than x;, they could download x; in IS Pk but x2 in IS P - k. 
They all get the same payoff as the user whose P2P requirement 
is x;, so they all subscribe to ISP_k and ISPk would get no 
subscribers. 
Above all , under some condition IS Pk could get certain num-
ber of subscribers but its profit is negative. 
Case 4 
If IS Pk sets a lower price for up link Qk == q* - c5 and increases 
the price downlink in the way so that 
We could apply the same methodology as in Case (3) and prove 
that under some condition IS Pk could get certain number of 
subscribers but its profit is negative. 
Up till now, we have proven that if IS Pk sets a lower price 
for uplink and a higher price for downlink, it could not get more 
benefit. 
Symmetrically, there are other four cases where IS Pk sets a 
higher price for uplink and a lower price for downlink. Applying 
the same methodology as in previous cases, we could prove t hat 
it is also not beneficial. 
Above all, we have exhausted all the possible ways for one ISP 
to deviate from the equilibrium, and the analysis shows that it is 
not beneficial for one ISP to deviate from the equilibrium price 
setting while the other ISPs set the equilibrium prices. 
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We also need to prove that no ISP can get a better profit 
by adopting flat-rate pricing when the others are using uplink 
pricing. Suppose ISPk adopts flat-rate pricing with price Pk, 
and the other ISPs adopt uplink pricing with price p* and q*, 
the stable price setting as in Lemma 3.3.2. ISPk could attract 
user i only if Pk < p* + q*ii, under which condition ISPk would 
run a deficit. 
• 
D End of chapter. 
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